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1 – Introduction 
The year 2004 saw a resurgence of initial public offerings in Brazil after more 
than a decade of IPO drought. There was an unusual flow of IPOs until the global financial 
crisis in 2008 drew the market to a halt. This IPOs wave occurred in a poorly regulated 
market: many firms received either equity or debt capital from their future underwriters 
to fund growth and, thus, take advantage of such window. However, it was not until 
January 2008 that the National Association of Investment Banks (ANBID) included in its 
Self-Regulation Code a clause forcing underwriters to disclose existing equity or debt 
conflicts of interest (ANBID, 2008). In June 2008, rumors1 began relating the poor 
performance of Brazilian IPOs to conflict of interest. As response, in March 2009 ANBID 
amended its code by requiring a second non-conflicted underwriter in the cases of 
significant conflict of interest (10 percent of equity capital or more than 20 percent of 
proceeds dedicated to debt repayment).  
The literature is not conclusive on how opportunistically banks behave in the 
presence of either equity or debt conflict of interest. Banks may profit by distributing 
overvalued securities, but concern with reputation and consequent loss in future 
businesses could prevent them from engaging in such behavior. Whether concern with 
reputation is enough to prevent opportunistic behavior has remained an empirical 
question (Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool, 2009, provide a comprehensive review of this 
literature). 
Loan-conflicted relationship and subsequent underwriting of debt securities have 
been extensively studied (in the US: Ang and Richardson, 1994; Kroszner and Rajan, 
1994; Puri, 1996, 1999; Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter, 1997; and Roten and 
Mullineaux, 2002; and in Japan: Hamao and Hoshi, 2002; Konishi, 2002; Takaoka and 
McKenzie, 2006; and Kang and Liu, 2007). Overall, there is no evidence of opportunistic 
behavior, suggesting that the potential loss in reputation is enough to prevent 
                                                 
1
 In Brazil’s IPO Rush Hits Rough Patch on the first page of The Wall Street Journal of June 20, 2008, one 
reads: “Two thirds of IPOs are now trading below their offering price. Some investors are blaming the 
banks that brought the deals to market, saying they cashed in on the frenzy for emerging markets by rushing 
to take unprepared companies public. Along the way, say investors, banks engaged in questionable practices 
including lending some companies large sums before taking them public and collecting extra fees on 
opening day.” 
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opportunism. However, this result may derive from two factors: the relatively weak 
incentive to misprice when there is loan conflict and the lack of opportunity to disguise 
mispricing in the underwriting of debt securities. 
 The existing models on conflicts of interest in underwriting (Kanatas and Qi, 
1998 and 2003; Puri, 1999; and Rajan, 2002) focus on loan-conflicted relationships. We 
are not aware of any model focusing on equity-based conflict and do not provide one. 
Nonetheless, incentives for shirking may be stronger for equity as compared to loan-based 
conflict. The return that banks receive from loans does not depend on the price of the 
securities that their clients subsequently issue, whereas the return on equity does. For 
instance, in an equity offering, the higher the issuing price, the less equity dilution current 
shareholders suffer. 
Chances for disguising mispricing are higher in the issuance of equity than debt 
securities: the cash flow of debt securities is predetermined allowing comparison across 
issues, there is a rating supplied by an independent agent, and ex post performance 
(default rate) is observable. Things are different for equity securities: cash flow is not 
predetermined, the measurement of ex post performance is not straightforward (Ritter, 
2002) and the price stabilization process allows underwriters to manipulate price in the 
short run and, thus, disguise overpricing.  
Studies on loan-conflict and equity in the underwriting of IPOs do not present 
conclusive evidence of conflict of interest. Outside the U.S., Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha 
(2001), Schenone (2004), and Santos, da Silveira, and Barros (2011) focus on short-term 
performance (underpricing), while Benzoni and Schenone (2010) focus on long-term.2 
None of these articles controls for the effect of price stabilization. In the U.S., even though 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003) report the existence of direct equity conflict by 
underwriters holding equity position in issuing firms, the studies are centered on indirect 
equity conflict via holdings in venture capital funds. Gompers and Lerner (1999) focus 
on the existence of conflict, and Li and Masulis (2004) on the size of the stake. None of 
them finds evidence of conflicts of interest. 
                                                 
2 Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha (2001) report less underpricing for conflicted IPOs, but this result comes from 
mean comparison, limiting the strength of the conclusions. Schenone (2004) finds that IPOs from firms that 
had a loan relationship with a possible underwriter show less underpricing, but no difference when firms 
had a loan relationship with the actual underwriter. Santos, da Silveira, and Barros (2011) do not control 
for price stabilization. 
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This article investigates the possibility that conflicted underwriters overprice IPOs 
and use price stabilization to disguise overpricing. Briefly, in the price stabilization 
process underwriters short sell shares by borrowing them from the issuers3 
(overallotment). Subsequently, underwriters cover this position either by buying shares 
in the secondary market (aftermarket short covering, ASC) or by exercising the greenshoe 
option. In this way underwriters can repurchase shares when price falls below the issuing 
price without bearing any loss. This mechanism allows underwriters to manipulate the 
price in the secondary market, disguising overpricing. 
For several reasons Brazil is a good setting to study how conflict of interest affects 
price stabilization and IPO pricing. First, information on price stabilization is mandatory 
which allows investigating whether conflict of interest affects price stabilization. We 
study three aspects of price stabilization: exercise of the overallotment option, the 
occurrence of price stabilization and its intensity.4 Second, the stabilization period for all 
the IPOs in our sample is of the same length. This allows an analysis of price returns at 
the end of the stabilization period and thus, isolation of the effect of stabilization on price 
returns. Third, the sample includes both equity and loan-conflicted IPOs, making it 
possible to investigate the effect of each of the conflicts. 
Our analysis indicates that equity-based conflict has a strong effect on the 
stabilization process: it increases the probability of full overallotment, occurrence of 
stabilization and its intensity. Loan-based conflict increases the probability of occurrence, 
but has no effect on intensity and no clear impact on overallotment. For none of the 
conflicts we find evidence of overpricing during the stabilization period. However, in the 
post-stabilization period returns for equity-conflicted IPOs are 8 to 9 percent lower than 
for non-conflicted ones. We find no evidence of mispricing in loan-conflicted IPOs. 
These results are robust with respect to the termination date of the stabilization process 
and the length of the post-stabilization period. 
                                                 
3 In the underwriting contract, issuers give the underwriters the right to borrow shares in excess of the 
contracted number and to sell them along with the contracted shares at the same price. This clause is called 
overallotment option. 
4 The underwriter is allowed to buy and resell shares during the price stabilization period. Thus, price 
stabilization may occur with zero net repurchased number of shares (intensity). Thus, occurrence and 
intensity capture distinct dimensions of price stabilization. 
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Overall our evidence on price stabilization and short-term results suggests that an 
equity-based conflict (but not a loan-based) leads underwriters to overprice issues and use 
price stabilization to disguise this. Such result corroborates our argument that incentives 
to overprice IPOs are stronger in equity-based than in loan-based relationships. These 
results have policy implications because they indicate that in some circumstances 
conflicted investment banks may behave opportunistically and harm investors. The table 
below summarizes our results:  
Affect probability of:  Full  
Overallotment 
Stabilization 
Stabilization 
Intensity 
Overpricing 
Using Stabilization 
to Cover Mispricing 
Loan-conflicted unclear Yes no no not likely 
Equity-conflicted yes Yes yes yes yes 
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our data and variables. 
Section 3 explains our methodology. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 –Data and Variables 
Data on offerings come from prospectuses and announcement of end of 
distribution available at the homepages of Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM), 
Companhia Brasileira Liquidacao e Custodia (CBLC), and BMFBovespa (former 
Bovespa).5 Announcements of end of distribution provide details on overallotment, 
aftermarket short covering (ASC: number of shares repurchased and resold), and 
allocation of shares across investor classes. Price quotations come from Economatica. 
Our initial sample consists of all 106 IPOs that occurred at Bovespa from 
Jan/2004 to Jun/2008. Before 2004 virtually there were no IPOs in Brazil (De Carvalho 
and Pennacchi, 2012). After June 2008 IPOs were subject to the self-regulation imposed 
by ANBID requiring a non-conflicted co-managing underwriter in the case of significant 
conflict of interest. From the initial sample we drop one IPO conducted on the best-efforts 
basis, one for which there was no provision for price stabilization, and six that were 
distributed exclusively to institutional investors. Thus, our final sample consists of 98 
IPOs.  
Loan conflict is identified by a loan of at least US$ 150,000 from one leading 
underwriter or a parent company. Equity conflict is identified by at least five percent pre-
                                                 
5 www.cvm.gov.br, www.cblc.com.br and www.bmfbovespa.com.br . 
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IPO ownership of one leading underwriter. Among the IPOs that we excluded there was 
only one loan-conflicted IPO and no equity-conflicted IPO. In our sample 39 IPOs were 
either equity or loan conflicted: 31 were loan-conflicted, 15 were equity-conflicted, and 
7 were both. Because an equity conflict presents stronger incentives for opportunism than 
a loan conflict, we classify issues that have both conflicts as equity-conflicted and refer 
to those that are only loan-conflicted as loan-only. 
Variables characterizing the price stabilization process are: Overallotment, a 
dummy variable indicating when the overallotment was exercised at its maximum 
established level; Stabilization (occurrence of stabilization), a dummy variable indicating 
the occurrence of ASC; and Stabilization Intensity, the ratio of ASC to overallotment (if 
there were no ASC or if shares repurchased were entirely resold, this variable takes a 
value zero; if the overallotment was entirely covered by repurchasing shares, it takes 
value one). 6 Table 1 lists all variables. 
Variables characterizing the issue are: Size, natural logarithm of the offering 
(issuing price multiplied by the number of shares excluding overallotment and hot issue 
options); Syndicate, number of underwriters in the syndicate; Underwriter, the Carter and 
Manaster (1990) index for underwriter reputation, updated by Loughran and Jay Ritter 
(2004) for the 2001-2004 period. Our measure corresponds to the index of the most 
reputable member of the syndicate. Underwriters not ranked were assigned the lowest 
rate, i.e., 1.1; Price, offer price; Price Range, difference between the maximum and 
minimum price in initial filling range divided by their average; Price Revision, offer price 
minus the midpoint of the initial filling range divided by the latter; Retail Investors, 
number of retail investors that received allocation in the IPO; and Institutional Investors, 
number of institutional investors that received shares in the IPO7. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the whole sample. The average 
overallotment was 14.2 percent. The overallotment was below its possible maximum 
value of 15 percent in only 13 IPOs. ASC occurred in 55 IPOs (56 percent of the 98 IPOs). 
On average 34.4 percent of the overallotment was covered in the aftermarket. In 10 cases 
                                                 
6  In our sample, all IPOs had an established maximum overallotment of 15 percent. Only 13 IPOs were not 
overalloted at this upper limit. Because of such mild cross-sectional variation, it became convenient to 
define a binary variable. 
7 International plus domestic institutional investors. Domestic institutional investors, such as underwriters 
and partners of the issuing company are excluded. 
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the underwriter repurchased shares and resold all of them during the stabilization period 
(the intensity of the stabilization was zero). In 53 IPOs the overallotment was entirely 
covered by exercise of the greenshoe option (55.2 percent of the 96 overalloted IPOs). In 
20 IPOs the overallotment was entirely covered in the aftermarket (20.8 percent of the 
overalloted IPOs). The average of the exercised greenshoe in relation to the initial 
offering was 9.31 percent. The hot-issue option was exercised in only 15 IPOs, and in all 
of these cases the overallotment was exercised at its maximum level, suggesting a pecking 
order: Underwriters first overallot, and then exercise the hot-issue option. In only three 
IPOs for which the hot-issue was exercised was there ASC (20% of the cases).  
Table 3 reports correlations. In general correlations are relatively low (below 
0.4) and of no statistical significance. As expected, correlation coefficients among 
variables measuring demand (Institutional Investors, Retail Investors, and Price Revision) 
are relatively high, but the highest is 0.643 (between Institutional Investors and Price 
Revision), suggesting that these variables capture distinct aspects of the demand. 
3 – Methodology 
The existing models on price stabilization (Benveniste, Busab, and Wilhelm, 
1996; Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Prabhala and Puri, 1998; and Zhang, 2004) predict 
that stabilization depends on the riskiness and the demand for the issue. Thus, our 
econometric model to analyze the effect of conflict of interest on price stabilization has 
the following specification: 
  UDRCIDependent 43210

, (1) 
where 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 can be Overallotment, Stabilization, or Stabilization Intensity. 
CI is a dummy variable indicating existent conflict of interest between the issuer and 
its underwriter (Equity, Loan-only or none); 
R

 is a vector of variables characterizing the riskiness of issue; and 
 D

  is a vector of variables representing the demand for the issue. 
 
Since Overallotment and Stabilization are binary variables, estimations use probit 
regressions. As Intensity of Stabilization is bounded between 0 and 100%, estimations 
use Tobit regressions. Variables possibly related to the riskiness of the issue are: Size, 
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Syndicate, Price, and Price Range. Variables associated to the demand are: Price 
Revision, Retail Investors, and Institutional Investors.  
To estimate the effect of conflict of interest on returns we use a balanced panel: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1CI𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡, (2) 
where 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the price return for firm i on the trading day t measured with respect to the issuing 
price; 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the return of the Bovespa index over the t first trading days of the issue i; and 
𝑋𝑖 is a time-invariant vector of characteristics of the IPO. 
𝛽1 gauges the excess return of conflicted IPOs relative to non-conflicted IPOs over the 
sample period. If conflicted IPOs underperform non-conflicted ones, 𝛽1 must be negative. 
We estimate Model 2 using random effects with White (1980) robust errors. We estimate 
Model 2 over the stabilization and post-stabilization periods separately.  
A third model aims at capturing the impact of the termination of price stabilization 
on the returns of conflicted IPOs: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝑖  +  𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑖  ×  Stabilization𝑖𝑡  +   𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡  +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3) 
where 
Stabilization𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the stabilization period for issue i. 
𝛽2  measures the difference in returns of conflicted IPOs during and after the price 
stabilization period. If returns are lower in the post-stabilization period β2 is positive. The 
difference in returns in the post-stabilization period between conflicted and non-
conflicted IPOs is given by   𝛽1 . The difference in returns during the price stabilization 
period between both groups of IPO is given by   𝛽1 + 𝛽2 . We estimate Model 3 using 
fixed effects and random effects with firm clusters. Both estimations use White (1980) 
robust errors. 
Identifying the termination of the price stabilization period is crucial for Models 
2 and 3. Fortunately, all IPOs in our sample had a specified stabilization period of 30 
running days. This represents from 20 to 22 trading days, depending on holidays and the 
day of the week on which the IPO took place. Price stabilization can also in fact end 
before the deadline. Since we cannot precisely identify when price stabilization is over, 
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we replicate the analysis using three possible termination dates: the 18th, 20th and 22nd 
trading days. 
4 – Empirical Results 
 
4.1 – Univariate analysis 
Univariate analysis in Table 2 anticipates our main results of the effect of conflict 
of interest on price stabilization. Equity conflict affects price stabilization in its three 
dimensions, while loan-only conflict affects just the probability of occurrence of ASC.  
Equity conflict increases overallotment: on average the overallotment of equity-
conflicted IPOs is 14.9 versus 13.8 percent for non-conflicted ones (difference 
statistically significant at the one percent level); increases the probability of ASC: 73 
versus 44 percent (difference statistically significant at the five percent level); and 
increases the intensity stabilization: in average 57 percent of the overallotment is covered 
in the ASC versus 44 percent (difference statistically significant at the five percent level). 
The only consequence of loan-conflict is an increase in the probability of ASC: 75 versus 
44 percent (difference statistically significant at the one percent level). 
Univariate analysis does not indicate any statistically significant effect of conflict 
of interest on price returns. Over the price stabilization period average market adjusted 
returns for equity, loan-only and non-conflicted IPOs are 4.7, 3.8 and 5.5 percent 
respectively. Over the post-stabilization period these returns are 1.2, 4.8 and 5.0 percent. 
One should note that after the stabilization, returns on equity conflicted IPOs drop by 3.5 
percent, while returns on loan-only conflict increase by 1.0 percent. 
 Price revision is the only covariate for which there is statistically significant 
difference between loan-only and non-conflicted IPOs: -8.5 versus -2.3 percent. Equity-
conflicted IPOs on average have larger syndicates (2.4 versus 1.9 members) and lower 
prices (BR$ 2.71 versus 2.96). 
4.2 – Price stabilization 
Table 4 presents our econometric analysis of the determinants of price 
stabilization (Model 1). Panel A focuses on the overallotment (whether it is exercised at 
its maximum possible value). Equity conflict of interest affects overallotment. The 
coefficient 0.922 on Equity in Regression 1 is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
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level. The coefficient of 0.836 on Loan-only is not statistically significant, but the t-
statistic of 1.64 suggests that the lack of significance may be due to sample size. In 
Regressions 2 and 3, coefficients on variables Equity and Loan-only are smaller and lose 
statistical significance (t-statistics are near 1.3). This is so because the estimated effect 
for both variables is positive. Thus, the omission of one variable raises the average value 
of the residual group, lowering the coefficient and the statistical significance of the other 
variable. Besides conflicts of interest, ex-ante demand is the only other factor affecting 
overallotment. Price Revision and Retail Investors have positive coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels respectively. 
Panel B focuses on the determinants of occurrence of ASC (Stabilization). Both 
variables Equity and Loan-only have positive signs and are statistically significant in all 
regressions. In regression 4 the coefficient 1.503 on Equity is statistically significant at 
the one percent level and the coefficient 0.954 on Loan-only is statistically significant at 
the five percent level. Once again, since both coefficients are positive, the omission of 
one variable in Regressions 5 and 6 reduces the size and statistical significance of the 
other. Nevertheless, both coefficients remain statistically significant. 
Several characteristics of the IPO also affect the occurrence of price stabilization. 
Variable Size bears a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the five or one 
percent level (five percent in Regressions 5 and 6 and one percent in Regression 4). The 
size of the syndicate has similar effect, even though it is statistically significant only in 
Regressions 4 and 6. The coefficient on the reputation of the underwriter is positive and 
statistically significant at the ten percent level in Regressions 4 and 6. Variable Price 
Range has positive and statistically significant coefficients in Regressions 5 and 6. The 
coefficient on Price is not statistically significant in any regression. Variables associated 
with ex-ante demand are also important to predict stabilization. Price Revision is negative 
and statistically significant at the five or one percent level. This seems to be a 
consequence of the partial adjustment phenomenon detected by Hanley (1993). When 
price is adjusted upward, it subsequently increases, reducing the need for stabilization. 
Finally, the sign associated with Retail Investor is positive and statistically significant at 
the five or one percent level. This can be due to the presence of flippers among retail 
investors, who trade their shares immediately after the distribution, and force price 
downward. 
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Finally, Panel C focuses on the determinants of the intensity of stabilization. The 
coefficient on Equity is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level in 
Regressions 7 and 9. Distinctively, t-statistics for the coefficients on Loan-Only in 
Regressions 7 and 8 are very low (0.63 and -0.18), suggesting that a loan conflict does 
not affect the intensity of the stabilization at all. Syndicate and Price Revision are the only 
other variables that bear statistical significance. Both variables have negative coefficients 
that are statistically significant at the ten or five percent level.  
Overall, our analysis indicates that conflict of interest affects price stabilization. 
A loan conflict affects only the likeliness of stabilization but not its intensity, suggesting 
that it does not motivate underwriters to resort to price stabilization to disguise 
mispricing. Equity conflict increases the probability of the issue being fully overallotted 
and stabilized, and the intensity of the stabilization suggesting that stabilization could be 
used to disguise overpricing. But before jumping to that conclusion one needs to analyze 
its effects on short-term returns. 
4.3 – Short-term returns 
Table 5 reports estimations of price returns with respect to the issuing price over 
several periods (Mode1 1).  Regressions 1, 2, and 3 focus on underpricing (first-day 
returns).  Conflict of interest seems to have no impact on underpricing; the coefficients 
on variables Equity and Loan-only are always positive, very small and not statistical 
significant (t-statistics below 0.7). This result differs from that of Schenone (2004) who 
finds that loan-conflicted IPOs are less underpriced than non-conflicted ones. The only 
variables with explanatory power over underpricing are those related to the reputation of 
the underwriter and the demand. The coefficient on Underwriter is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on Price Revision is 
positive and statistically significant at the five or one percent level (confirming the partial 
adjustment phenomenon of Hanley, 1993). The number of retail investors receiving 
allocation decreases the underpricing, while the number of institutional investors 
increases it. Both variables are statistically significant at the five or one percent level.  
Regressions 4, 5, and 6 cover the price stabilization period. As in the underpricing 
regressions, the variables associated with conflict of interest bear no statistical 
significance. The coefficient on Equity becomes negative and its t-statistics increases to 
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near 1.5. The lack of statistical significance may be due to small sample size. The 
coefficient on Loan-only remains positive with low t-statistics (below 0.8). As expected, 
the coefficient around 0.6 on the market index is statistically significant at the one percent 
level (t-statistic above 8.0). Results for the other variables are similar to those in 
Regressions 1-3. 
Regressions 7-12 focus on the post-stabilization period. We use two post-
stabilization windows: from the 19th to the 30th trading days (Regressions 7-9) and from 
the 23rd to the 30th (Regressions 10-12). The main result that emerges is that returns on 
equity-conflicted IPOs are negative and statistically significant and those on Loan-
conflicted are positive but not statistically significant. In Regression 7 the coefficient on 
Equity is -0.0813, indicating equity conflicted IPOs underperforms non-conflicted ones 
by 8.13 percent. This result is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In Regression 
8, the relative underperformance of equity-conflicted IPOs increases to 8.64 percent. The 
underperformance measured in Regression 8 is higher than in Regression 7 because 
Regression 8 omits Loan-only. Consequently, the performance of equity-conflicted IPOs 
is compared to the pool of loan-conflicted and non-conflicted IPOs. As the coefficient on 
Loan-only is positive, its omission increases the average return on the residual group, 
exacerbating the underperformance of equity-conflicted IPOs. Regressions 7 and 9 
confirm that loan-conflict does not cause IPOs to be overpriced. In fact, they are 
underpriced, even though the result is not statistically significant. 
Results in Regressions 10-12 are similar to those in Regressions 7-9 both in terms 
of magnitude and statistical significance, indicating that our results are robust with respect 
to the termination date for price stabilization. 
Table 5 also shows that Price Revision loses statistical significance immediately 
after the end of the price stabilization period. This suggests that the partial adjustment 
may result from price stabilization: when underwriters revise price upwards they use price 
stabilization to prevent prices from falling below the issuing price, truncating the return 
distribution at zero and, thus, generating positive returns.  
Table 6 analyzes the impact of the termination of price stabilization on returns 
(Model 3). Our analysis includes the usual controls, but we report only the coefficients 
on the dummy variables Equity and Loan-only and their interactions with the dummy 
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variable indicating the stabilization period. Odd-numbered regressions use random effects 
and even-numbered regressions, fixed effects. The sample in Panel A includes both 
stabilized and non-stabilized IPOs. Regression 1 uses random effects and assumes that 
stabilization terminates on the 18th trading day.  
 The coefficient of −0.0692 on Equity, statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level, indicates that equity conflicted IPOs underperform non-conflicted IPOs by 6.92 
percent in the post-stabilization period. The coefficient of 0.0362 on the interaction 
between Equity and Stabilization, statistically significant at the five percent level, 
indicates that in the post-stabilization period the price of equity-conflicted IPOs falls on 
average by 3.62 percent. In Regression 2 the use of fixed effects only slightly changes 
coefficients and t-statistics. One should note that the coefficient on Loan-only and its 
interaction with Stabilization are positive but very small and not statistically significant. 
Therefore, loan-conflicted IPOs do not underperform non-conflicted ones in both periods 
and there is no significant change in price at the termination of stabilization. Regressions 
3-8 consider distinct termination dates for price stabilization. Regressions 3 and 4 assume 
the 20th trading day; 5 and 6, the 22nd; and 7 and 8 assumes that the 17th and also excludes 
the 18th to 22nd trading days. Change in termination dates only marginally affects 
coefficients and statistical significance. 
The sample in Panel B retains only IPOs that were stabilized. The effect of 
termination of price stabilization on the returns of equity-conflicted IPOs becomes 
stronger. For example, From Regression 1 to Regression 9 the coefficient on the 
interaction of Equity and Stabilization increases to 0.0517 and remains statistically 
significant, indicating that returns at the end of stabilization period for equity conflicted 
IPOs fall by 5.17 percent. One should note that the coefficient on Loan-only increases to 
0.0253 becoming closer to significance level (t-statistics is 1.40). The coefficient on its 
interaction with variable Stabilization is very close to zero in terms of both size and 
statistical significance. Therefore, if any effect exists, loan-conflicted IPOs overperform 
non-conflicted ones and price stabilization has no effect on their returns. This result is in 
lines with that of Kang and Liu (2007) who find that underwriters discount the price of 
loan-conflicted bonds.  Once again, the use of fixed effects (Regression 10) or the 
variation of the termination date (Regressions 11 to 16) only slightly changes the 
coefficients on both parameters and their associated t-statistics. 
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Figure 1 illustrates our main results on short-term returns. It plots adjusted returns 
with respect to issuing price until the 40th trading day. A vertical line marks the 20th 
trading day, around which stabilization terminates. Market-adjusted returns for the pool 
of non-conflicted and loan-conflicted IPOs are fairly stable around five percent. For 
equity-conflicted IPOs, the initial underpricing is around eight percent; during the price 
stabilization period, returns are similar to those of non-conflicted IPOs. After the end of 
price stabilization, returns of equity-conflicted IPOs drop significantly. 
Overall our analysis indicates that a loan conflict does not affect price stabilization 
and does not cause mispricing of IPOs. Differently, equity conflict causes IPOs to be 
overpriced. Furthermore, equity conflict also intensifies the stabilization efforts. These 
results suggest that underwriters overprice equity-conflicted IPOs and use price 
stabilization to disguise such overpricing. 
5 – Conclusion  
Commercial banks acting as underwriters can potentially benefit themselves or 
their corporate clients at the expense of investors. By harming investors, banks run the 
risk of losing their investors clients and, consequently, the capacity to place issues. 
Whether concern with reputation is enough to discourage price manipulation has 
remained an empirical matter. A variety of authors have examined banks that provide 
customer loans and subsequently underwrite their debt securities without finding 
evidence of conflicts of interest.  
We argue that equity vis-à-vis debt conflict gives the bank stronger incentives to 
manipulate prices. Equity-conflicted underwriters can reduce ownership dilution by 
overpricing the issue and thus increase returns on their equity investment. Debt-conflicted 
underwriters cannot increase the return on their debt investment by overpricing issues, 
since the cash flow of debt securities is predetermined. We also argue that issuance of 
equity vis-à-vis debt securities gives the underwriter more room to disguise mispricing. 
Debt securities have predetermined cash flows, an independent agent opinion (rating) and 
easily observable ex-post performance (default rate). Equity securities have variable cash 
flow, no independent agent opinion, no easily measured ex post performance. 
Additionally, the price stabilization mechanism allows underwriters to manipulate prices 
in the secondary market and thus, camouflage overpricing in the short run. Even though 
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the underwriting of equity securities by equity-conflicted banks is common in many 
countries, only few articles studied this case, without finding evidence of harm to 
investors. The absence of control for price stabilization may explain such results, mainly 
because in most countries underwriters are not bound to disclose information on price 
stabilization. 
Brazil offers a good setting for studying the issuance of equity securities. An 
institutional feature forces underwriters to disclose information on the price stabilization 
process and on the ex-ante demand for the IPO. Furthermore, all IPOs have the same price 
stabilization period of 30 running days. These features allow us to study whether conflict 
of interest affects price stabilization and the behavior of short-term returns of conflicted 
IPOs at the end of the stabilization period. 
 Our analysis indicates that loan-based conflict does not distort piece stabilization 
and does not cause IPOs overpricing. Differently, equity-based conflict distorts price 
stabilization: it increases the chances of the issue being fully overalloted and stabilized, 
as well as the intensity of the stabilization. We also find that equity-conflicted IPOs are 
overpriced, but that overpricing is observable only after the termination of the 
stabilization process. These findings suggest that price stabilization may be used to 
disguise mispricing. 
We also find that the partial adjustment phenomenon detected by Hanley (1993) 
is observable only during the price stabilization period. Variable Price Revision loses 
statistical significance immediately after the end of the stabilization period. This suggests 
that partial adjustment may result from price stabilization: when underwriters revise price 
upwards they use price stabilization to prevent prices from falling below the issuing price, 
truncating the distribution of return and, thus, generating positive returns.  
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Table 1 
Variables Description 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 
return with respect to the issuing price of firm i on the trading day t: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 =
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑜 − 1
⁄  
Loan-Only 
Dummy variable indicating that the firms received loan but not equity investment 
from the underwriter. 
Equity 
Dummy variable indicating that the firms received equity investment from the 
underwriter. 
Size Natural logarithm of the initial offering times the issuing price (in Brazilian reais) 
Syndicate Number of underwriters in the syndicate 
Underwriter 
Carter and Manaster’s index for underwriters reputation (1990), updated in 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) for the period between 2001 and 2004. The rate 
corresponds to the most reputable member of the syndicate. Underwriters not 
ranked were assigned the lowest rate, i.e., 1.1.   
Price Natural logarithm of the offer price. 
Price Range 
Difference between the maximum and minimum price in initial filling range divided 
by the midpoint of the filling range 
Price Revision Offer price minus the midpoint of the initial filling divided by the latter. 
Retail Investors Number of retail investors that received shares in the IPO.  
Institutional  
Investors 
Number of institutional investors that received shares in the IPO (international 
investors plus domestic institutional investors.  domestic institutional investors, 
such as underwriters and partners of the issuing company were excluded) 
Stabilization Dummy variable indicating the stabilization period. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Sample consists of 98 IPO at Bovespa between 2004 and 2008, being 15 equity-conflicted, 24 loan but not equity 
conflicted and 49 non-conflicted. Variables are Overallotment: as proportion of the maximum possible value 
established in the prospectus; Stabilization: dummy variable indicating that there was ASC; Stabilization Intensity: 
number of shares repurchased in the ASC divided by the overallotment, Underpricing return on the first trading day 
with respect to the issuing price; Average return x-y is the average of the market adjusted returns between days x 
and y; Size: initial offering times the issuing price in BR$;  Syndicate: number of underwriters in the syndicate;  
Underwriter: Carter and Manaster (1990) index for underwriters reputation updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004); 
Price: natural logarithm of the offer price; Price Range: difference between the maximum and minimum price in 
initial filling range divided their average; Price Revision: the offer price minus the midpoint of the initial filling 
range normalized by the latter; Retail Investors: number of retail investors that received shares in the IPO; and  
Institutional  Investors: number of institutional investors that received shares in the IPO. Standard-deviations or t-
statistics for difference in means are in parentheses. 
 Full Sample 
Equity-
conflicted 
Loan-only-
conflicted 
Neither 
Difference 
Neither - 
Loan  
Difference 
Neither - 
Equity  
Overallotment 
14% 14.9% 14.4% 13.8% -0.6% -1.2%*** 
(2.3) (0.1%) (1.9%) (3.1%) (1.07) (2.84) 
Stabilization  
56% 73% 75% 44% -31%*** -29%** 
(55/98) (11/15) (18/24) (26/49) (2.77) (2.16) 
Stabilization 
Intensity 
34% 57% 41% 28% -13% -29%** 
(44%) (43%) (45%) (42%) (1.21) (2.34) 
Underpricing 
5.5% 8.2% 3.6% 5.6% 2.0% -2.6% 
(10.3%) (16.2%) (6.3%) (0.097%) (1.11) (0.59) 
Average Return 1-19 
5.0% 4.7% 3.8% 5.5% 1.7% 0.8% 
(0.117) (0.168) (0.09) (0.112) (0.72) (0.18) 
Average Return 20-
30 
4.3% 1.2% 4.8% 5.0% 0.1% 3.8% 
(0.144) (0.21) (0.123) (0.133) (0.04) (0.66) 
Size 
712 1159 562 659 96 -500 
(826) (1569) (198) (684) (0.98) (1.21) 
Syndicate 
2.01 2.40 2.04 1.89 -0.14 -0.50** 
(0.805) (0.828) (0.690) (0.824) (0.80) (2.09) 
Underwriter 
8.847 9.001 8.876 8.79 -0.078 -0.20 
(0.841) (0) (128.71) (63.56) (0.50) (1.46) 
Price 
2.88 2.71 2.80 2.96 0.158 0.25** 
(0.408) (0.358) (0.403) (0.409) (1.62) (2.31) 
Price Range 
0.215 0.227 0.221 0.209 -0.011 -0.018 
(0.051) (0.039) (0.051) (0.054) (0.91) (1.46) 
Price Revision 
-0.035 0.003 -0.085 -0.023 0.062* -0.026 
(0.158) (0.203) (0.144) (0.149) (1.77) (0.46) 
Retail Investors 
12,718 14,177 10,014 13,447 3432 -729 
(26,646) (16,481) (6,920) (33,148) (0.75) (0.12) 
Institutional 
Investors 
313 419 252 311 58.17 -108 
(252) (447) (108) (211) (1.60) (0.91) 
*, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.   
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Table 3 
Correlations 
Equity: dummy variable indicating that the firms received equity investment from the underwriter; Loan-Only: dummy variable indicating that the firms received loan but 
not equity investment from the underwriter; Size: natural logarithm of the initial offering times the issuing price (in Brazilian reais); Syndicate: number of underwriters in 
the syndicate; Underwriter: Carter and Manaster (1990) index for underwriters reputation updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004); Price: natural logarithm of the offer price; 
Price Range: difference between the maximum and minimum price in initial filling range divided by the midpoint of the filling range; Price Revision: offering price minus 
the midpoint of the initial filling divided by the latter; Retail Investors: number of retail investors that received shares in the IPO; and  Institutional  Investors: number of 
institutional investors that received shares in the IPO. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Loan- 
Only 
Equity Size Syndicate Underwriter Price 
Price 
Range 
Price 
Revision 
Retail 
Investors 
Equity 
-0.242*** 
(0.01) 
1        
Size 
-0.055 
(0.59) 
0.196* 
(0.05) 
1       
Syndicate 
0.022 
(0.82) 
0.207** 
(0.04) 
0.498*** 
(0.00) 
1      
Underwriter 
0.019 
(0.85) 
0.078 
(0.45) 
0.164 
(0.11) 
0.154 
(0.13) 
1     
Price 
-0.115 
(0.25) 
-0.178* 
(0.08) 
0.192* 
(0.06) 
0.011 
(0.91) 
0.072 
(0.47) 
1 
- 
 
  
Price Range 
0.065 
(0.52) 
0.105 
(0.31) 
-0.094 
(0.35) 
-0.199** 
(0.04) 
0.046 
(0.65) 
0.272*** 
(0.01) 
1   
Price Revision 
-0.184* 
(0.07) 
0.100 
(0.32) 
0.321*** 
(0.00) 
0.095 
(0.35) 
-0.017 
(0.86) 
0.448*** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
1  
Retail Investors 
-0.058 
(0.57) 
0.023 
(0.82) 
0.516*** 
(0.00) 
0.434*** 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.95) 
0.061 
(0.55) 
-0.154 
(0.13) 
0.31*** 
(0.00) 
1 
Institutional investors 
-0.137 
(0.18) 
0.179* 
(0.07) 
0.68*** 
(0.00) 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
0.051 
(0.62) 
0.353*** 
(0.00) 
-0.218** 
(0.03) 
0.643*** 
(0.00) 
0.55*** 
(0.00) 
*, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.   
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Table 4 
Conflict of Interest and Price Stabilization Process 
The dependent variable are: dummy variable indicating that the overallotment was fully exercised (Panel A), dummy variable indicating that there was ASC (Panel B) and the number of shares 
repurchased in the ASC divided by the overallotment (Panel C). Reported values are marginal effects. The variables are Equity: dummy variable indicating the existence of equity-conflict; Loan-
Only: dummy variable indicating loan but not equity-conflict of interest; Size: natural logarithm of the final offering value in BR$;  Syndicate: number of underwriters in the syndicate;  Underwriter: 
Carter and Manaster (1990) index for underwriters reputation updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004); Price: natural logarithm of the offer price; Price Range: difference between the maximum 
and minimum price in initial filling range divided their average; Price Revision: the offer price minus the midpoint of the initial filling range normalized by the latter; Retail Investors: number of 
retail investors that received shares in the IPO (in thousands); and  Institutional  Investors: number of institutional investors that received shares in the IPO (in thousands). Estimators obtained 
using White (1980) robust errors. T-Statistics are in parentheses. Sample in Panel A is 98 IPOs. Sample in Panels B and C consists of 96 IPOs for which there was overallotment. 
Regression 
Panel A 
Overallotment (probit) 
Panel B 
Stabilization Occurrence (probit) 
Panel C 
Stabilization Intensity (tobit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Equity 
0.922*  0.647 1.503***  1.165** 1.255**  1.166** 
(1.67)  (1.23) (3.20)  (2.51) (2.44)  (2.33) 
Loan-Only 
0.836 0.641  0.954** 0.658*  0.250 -0.073  
(1.64) (1.35)  (2.30) (1.67)  (0.63) (-0.18)  
Size 
-4.160 -2.347 -4.445 -17.79*** -14.99** -16.46** -7.773 -6.498 -7.647 
(-0.50) (-0.27) (-0.51) (-2.73) (-2.15) (-2.55) (-1.04) (-0.86) (-1.03) 
Syndicate 
-0.236 -0.219 -0.189 -0.496** -0.348 -0.418* -0.528** -0.401 -0.499* 
(-0.98) (-0.92) (-0.85) (-2.18) (-1.57) (-1.95) (-2.03) (-1.54) (-1.93) 
Underwriter dropped dropped dropped 
0.352* 0.391 0.333* 0.456 0.567 0.419 
(1.76) (1.46) (1.80) (1.03) (1.01) (1.12) 
Price Range 
-0.922 -0.374 -0.331 4.471 5.368* 5.314* 3.302 3.896 3.638 
(-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.09) (1.58) (1.92) (1.89) (0.96) (1.11) (1.05) 
Price 
-0.201 -0.402 -0.346 0.033 -0.227 -0.043 -0.367 -0.702 -0.392 
(-0.44) (-0.90) (-0.75) (0.07) (-0.51) (-0.10) (-0.71) (-1.38) (-0.78) 
Price-Revision 
2.569* 2.453* 2.210 -3.437** -2.844** -3.878*** -3.018** -2.717* -3.134** 
(1.95) (1.86) (1.64) (-2.45) (-2.30) (-2.77) (-2.11) (-1.90) (-2.17) 
Retail Investors 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.27) (2.22) (2.42) (2.69) (2.06) (2.38) (1.43) (0.93) (1.37) 
Institutional Investors 
-0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.05) (-1.44) (-1.28) (-0.87) (-0.69) (-0.60) (-0.59) 
Constant 
14.00 9.17 15.19 49.85*** 41.65** 46.13** 20.15 16.22 20.11 
(0.57) (0.36) (0.59) (2.60) (2.00) (2.43) (0.91) (0.71) (0.92) 
P-value (F-test) 0.0484 0.0529 0.101 0 0 0 0.0924 0.0825 0.0661 
*, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.   
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Table 5 
(Panel A) 
Conflict of Interest and IPO Returns over Different Periods 
Panel analysis. The dependent variable is the daily stock return with respect to the issuing price over different time intervals. The explanatory variables are Equity: dummy variable indicating that 
the underwriter is equity-conflicted,  Loan-Only: dummy variable indicating that the underwriter is loan but not equity-conflicted, Market Index: return on the Ibovespa index with respect to its 
value on the IPO date, Size: natural logarithm of the initial offering times the issuing price (in Brazilian reais), Syndicate: number of underwriters in the syndicate, Underwriter: Carter and 
Manaster’s index for underwriters reputation (1990), updated by Jay Ritter for the period between 2001 and 2004, Price natural logarithm of the offering price, Price Range: difference between 
the maximum and minimum price in initial filling range divided by the midpoint of the filling range, Price Revision: offering price minus the midpoint of the initial filling divided by the latter, 
Retail Investors: number of retail investors that received shares in the IPO (in thousands), and  Institutional  Investors: number of institutional investors that received shares in the IPO (in thousands). 
Regressions 1-3 are cross-section; 4-9 were obtained using random effects with White (1980) robust errors and firm clusters. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Period Underpricing Days 1-18 Days 19-30 Days 23-30 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Equity 
0.0077 0.0037  -0.0388 -0.0412  -0.0813* -0.0864**  -0.0852* -0.0907**  
(0.36) (0.19)  (-1.43) (-1.56)  (-1.93) (-2.06)  (-1.86) (-2.00)  
Loan-Only 
0.0115  0.0098 0.0069  0.0151 0.0149  0.0321 0.0160  0.0340 
(0.74)  (0.71) (0.35)  (0.79) (0.52)  (1.09) (0.51)  (1.08) 
Market Index 
0.6348 0.5852 0.6213 0.6099*** 0.6099*** 0.6108*** 0.6321*** 0.6318*** 0.6403*** 0.5982*** 0.5976*** 0.6107*** 
(1.39) (1.30) (1.37) (8.02) (8.02) (8.02) (5.77) (5.77) (5.88) (5.24) (5.24) (5.41) 
Size 
-0.0110 -0.0104 -0.0102 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0028 -0.0130 -0.0125 -0.0203 -0.0197 -0.0192 -0.0274 
(-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.51) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.13) (-0.44) (-0.42) (-0.68) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.84) 
Syndicate 
0.0014 0.0020 0.0019 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0028 0.0172 0.0182 0.0109 0.0214 0.0225 0.0147 
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.01) (0.04) (-0.19) (0.80) (0.85) (0.53) (0.93) (0.98) (0.67) 
Underwriter 
-0.0171*** -0.0170*** -0.0169*** -0.0151*** -0.0150*** -0.0159*** -0.0131** -0.0130** -0.0148** -0.0135** -0.0134** -0.0153** 
(-4.44) (-4.42) (-4.50) (-3.25) (-3.25) (-3.32) (-2.08) (-2.05) (-2.26) (-1.98) (-1.97) (-2.17) 
Price 
0.0149 0.0139 0.0129 0.0127 0.0120 0.0229 0.0247 0.0233 0.0463 0.0293 0.0278 0.0519 
(0.65) (0.61) (0.61) (0.51) (0.48) (1.01) (0.64) (0.59) (1.20) (0.70) (0.66) (1.24) 
Price Range 
-0.1312 -0.1206 -0.1263 0.1430 0.1483 0.1210 0.1781 0.1894 0.1337 0.1864 0.1984 0.1406 
(-0.87) (-0.79) (-0.83) (0.92) (0.94) (0.79) (0.73) (0.77) (0.56) (0.68) (0.72) (0.53) 
Price Revision 
0.1562*** 0.1513** 0.1575** 0.1431* 0.1409* 0.1344* 0.0876 0.0828 0.0697 0.0511 0.0460 0.0326 
(2.64) (2.59) (2.63) (1.95) (1.94) (1.85) (0.70) (0.66) (0.56) (0.37) (0.34) (0.24) 
Retail Investors 
-0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0006** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0012*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0016*** 
(-2.36) (-2.42) (-2.74) (-2.61) (-2.63) (-2.36) (-3.93) (-3.92) (-3.48) (-4.77) (-4.74) (-4.38) 
Institutional Investors 
0.2681*** 0.2685*** 0.2699*** 0.2666*** 0.2665*** 0.2586*** 0.2926*** 0.2924*** 0.2757*** 0.3223*** 0.3221*** 0.3046*** 
(6.14) (6.19) (6.32) (5.32) (5.31) (5.29) (3.50) (3.48) (3.42) (3.52) (3.50) (3.46) 
Constant 
0.3318 0.3226 0.3204 0.0417 0.0390 0.0926 0.2229 0.2170 0.3300 0.3346 0.3282 0.4476 
(0.82) (0.79) (0.80) (0.11) (0.10) (0.23) (0.41) (0.39) (0.60) (0.56) (0.54) (0.74) 
Observations 98 98 98 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,176 1,176 1,176 784 784 784 
Firms 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.630 0.628 0.630 0.415 0.414 0.404 0.362 0.361 0.342 0.358 0.356 0.339 
P-value (F-test) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.   
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Table 6 
Conflict of Interest and IPO Returns over Time: the Effect of Price Stabilization 
Panel analysis for the daily stock return with respect to the issuing price over the first 30 trading days after the IPO. Variables of interest are Equity: dummy variable indicating that the underwriter is equity-
conflicted, Loan-Only:  dummy variable indicating that the underwriter is loan but not equity-conflicted, and Stabilization: dummy variable indicating the stabilization period. Controls are: Market Index: return 
on the Ibovespa index with respect to its value on the IPO date, Size: natural logarithm of the initial offering times the issuing price (in Brazilian reais), Syndicate: number of underwriters in the syndicate, 
Underwriter: Carter and Manaster’s index for underwriters reputation (1990), updated by Jay Ritter for the period between 2001 and 2004, Price: natural logarithm of the offering price, Price Range: difference 
between the maximum and minimum price in initial filling range divided by the midpoint of the filling range, Price Revision: offering price minus the midpoint of the initial filling divided by the latter, Retail 
Investors: number of retail investors that received shares in the IPO (in thousands), and  Institutional  Investors: number of institutional investors that received shares in the IPO (in thousands). Odd regressions 
were obtained using random effects with robust errors and firm clusters and even specifications, using fixed effects with robust errors. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Panel A: sample contains stabilized and non-stabilized IPOs  
(2,940 firm-day observations from 98 IPOs, being 24 loan-only conflicted and 15 equity-conflicted) 
End of stabilization: 18Th day 20th day 22nd  Exclude 18-22nd days 
 Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Equity 
-0.0692*  -0.0707*  -0.0721*  -0.0719*  
(-1.81)  (-1.79)  (-1.76)  (-1.16)  
Equity * Stabilization 
0.0362** 0.0361** 0.0351* 0.0350* 0.0341* 0.0340* 0.0395* 0.0394* 
(2.02) (2.02) (1.81) (1.81) (1.69) (1.70) (1.81) (1.81) 
Loan-Only 
0.0071  0.0084  0.0077  0.0065  
(0.35)  (0.40)  (0.37)  (0.32)  
Loan-Only * Stabilization 
0.0106 0.0105 0.0092 0.0091 0.0102 0.0111 0.0130 0.0129 
(0.73) (0.73) (0.63) (0.63) (0.71) (0.72) (0.76) (0.76) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared (overall) 0.381 0.240 0.380 0.238 0.380 0.237 0.378 0.234 
F-test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: sample contains only stabilized IPOs  
(1,650 firm-day observations from 55 IPOs, being 18 loan-only conflicted and 11 equity-conflicted) 
End of stabilization: 18th day 20th day 22nd day Exclude 18-22nd days 
 Regression (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Equity 
-0.0678*  -0.0708*  -0.0728*  -0.0723*  
(-1.78)  (-1.76)  (-1.72)  (-0.59)  
Equity * Stabilization 
0.0517** 0.0516** 0.0514** 0.0512** 0.0496* 0.0495* 0.0574** 0.0572** 
(2.35) (2.36) (2.12) (2.13) (1.94) (1.95) (2.10) (2.11) 
Loan-Only 
0.0253  0.0265  0.0264  0.0244  
(1.40)  (1.47)  (1.46)  (1.37)  
Loan-Only * Stabilization 
0.0051 0.0050 0.0022 0.0021 0.0026 0.0025 0.0046 0.0044 
(0.31) (0.30) (0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.23) (0.22) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared (overall) 0.341 0.269 0.340 0.266 0.338 0.266 0.312 0.257 
F-test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.   
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Figure 1 
Daily Market-Adjusted Returns with Respect to Issuing Price 
Returns for each stock were adjusted by subtracting the market index return over the same period. 
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